Insurance Against Tort Liability—An Approach to the Cosmology of the Law by Gardner, George K.
INSURANCE AGAINST TORT LIABILITY-AN
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GEORGE K. GARDNER*
Insurance against tort liability has now become an everyday incident of American
life. Many would not think of driving a car, owning a building, or carrying on a
business without it; the law requires a great many people to carry it as a condition
of their daily activities; it is probable that insurance companies pay more than half
of all the tort judgments which are rendered each year. The business of writing
such insurance is not a new one. It has been practiced for more than half a century;
its routines are familiar to thousands whose livelihood it supplies. Nothwithstanding
all this, the law of the subject is riddled with absurdities and unsolved problems;
there exists no authoritative legal treatise about it in this country;1 there is no case-
book designed to assist its study; and the treatment of the subject in the existing
casebooks on general insurance law is fragmentary and incidental to their main
plan. This is an arresting, a challenging, state of affairs. It asks the law professors
where they have been all this time. It at least suggests the hypothesis that a system
of legal doctrine and legal instruction which neglects a fact at once so obvious
and so pervasive has lost its touch with the times.
A little reflection will, I think, make it apparent how this situation has come to
pass. Throughout the whole of the half century during which liability insurance
has been evolving in practice the orthodox law curriculum has been starting novices
on their studies with the proposition that the civil responsibility of the citi'en' is
divided between Contract and Tort. This proposition-like the proposition that
all Gaul is divided into three parts-is not easy to get out of one's head. It has
been reinforced by the enormous prestige of the American Law Institute, which has
propounded six hundred and nine black letter sections about Contracts and nine
hundred and fifty-one black letter sections about Torts as the authoritative restate-
ment of the American law. Now if you believe that the whole law of civil responsi-
bility is divided into Contract and Tort, the subject of liability insurance at once
becomes very recondite and abstruse. That it involves both of the two kinds of
civil responsibility is, of course, obvious at a glance. If the glance pauses and be-
comes reflective, it begins to look as if it involved both rather deeply; that perhaps
it not only crosses the boundary between Contract and Tort but erases it; that maybe
to really understand insurance against tort liability you must think Contract and
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Tort through again. This, of course, is rather too much for the busy practitioner
or the harassed law school instructor to do. What was the use of going to law
school if you can no longer rely on the basic truths you learned the first year? That,
perhaps, is why it falls to the lot of one who has pretty well used up his stock of
acquired dogmas and must, perforce, go to school again, to open up a train of
thought which perhaps other men may pursue.
The distinction between Contract and Tort may possibly not be of the essence.
It is conceivable that we might forget all about it and still preserve private enter-
prise, the dignity of the individual, the administration of impartial justice, and
the American way of life. At any rate, one may safely suggest this possibility in
195o without risking a charge of subversion, now that the distinction has been
abolished for eleven years in the federal courts. The Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, adopted on September i6, 1938, permit every kind of civil responsibility to
be enforced in one form of procedure known as a "civil action."2  If civil responsi-
bility may be viewed as a unit for purposes of procedure, it is at least possible that
it may be viewed as a unit from the standpoint of substantive law.
I
LIABILITY INSURANCE AND CONTRACT
Suppose we begin by examining the essential provisions of the automobile liability
insurance contract now in common use. The following extracts are taken from
the sample policy which Professor Edwin W. Patterson has selected for the appendix
to his excellent casebook on insurance law.
2
X Casualty Insurance Company agrees with the insured, named in the declarations
made a part hereof, in consideration of the payment of the premium and in reliance
upon the statements in the declarations and subject to the limits of liability, exclusions,
conditions and other terms of this policy....
COVERAGE A
Bodily Injury Liability: To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
become obligated to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon him by law for damages,
including damages for care and loss of services, because of bodily injury, including
death at any time resulting therefrom, sustained by any person or persons, caused by
accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile.
COVERAGE B
Property Damage Liability: To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured
shall become obligated to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon him by law for
damages because of injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof,
caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile.
Delense, Settlement, Supplementary Payments: As respects such insurance as is afforded
by the other terms of this policy
2 FED. R. CIv. P. 2.
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(a) under coverages A and B the company shall
(i) defend in his name and behalf any suit against the insured alleging such
injury or destruction and seeking damages on account thereof, even if such
suit is groundless, false or fraudulent; but the company shall have the right
to make such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any claim or suit
as it may be deemed expedient by the company ...
Definition of "Insured." The unqualified word "insured" wherever used in coverages
A and B and in other parts of this policy, when applicable to such coverages, includes
the named insured and, except where specifically stated to the contrary, also includes any
person while using the automobile and any person or organization legally responsible for
the use thereof, provided the actual use of the automobile is with the permission of the
named insured....
Name of Insured: (John Smith)
Limit of Liability for Bodily Injury Liability: $So,ooo each person; $2o,oo each accident.
This now commonplace form-which would certainly be described as a con-
tract and which is probably enforceable according to its terms anywhere in the United
States of America-raises at least three problems in the law of Contracts which
are not as dearly answered by the Contracts Restatement as they are in practice,
and which suggest that Chapter 6 of the Restatement might not unprofitably be
revised. These problems involve the application of sections 133, 134, 139, i42, 143,
147, and 572 of the Contracts Restatement which are quoted below.4
'RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932). §133. Definition of Donee Beneficiary, Creditor Beneficiary,
Incidental Beneficiary.
(x) Where performance of a promise in a contract will benefit a person other than the
promisee, that person is, except as stated in Subsection (3):
(a) a donee beneficiary if it appears from the terms of the promise in view of the accom-
panying circumstances that the purpose of the promisee in obtaining the promise of all
or part of the performance thereof is to make a gift to the beneficiary or to confer upon
him a right against the promisor to some performance neither due nor supposed or
asserted to be due from the promisee to the beneficiary;
(b) a creditor beneficiary if no purpose to make a gift appears from the terms of the
promise in view of the accompanying circumstances and performance of the promise will
satisfy an actual or supposed or asserted duty of the promisee to the beneficiary, or a right of
the beneficiary against the promisee which has been barred by the Statute of Limitations or
by a discharge in bankruptcy; or which is unenforceable because of the Statute of Frauds;
(c) an incidental beneficiary if neither the facts stated in Clause (a) nor those stated in
Clause (b) exist.
(2) Such a promise as is described in Subsection (ia) is a gift promise. Such a promise
as is described in Subsection (zb) is a promise to discharge the promisee's duty.
(3) Where it appears from the terms of the promise in view of the accompanying circumstances
that the purpose of the promisee is to benefit a beneficiary under a trust and the promise is to
render performance to the trustee, the trustee, and not the beneficiary under the trust, is a
beneficiary within the meaning of this Section.
§134. Contracts to Which Statements in This Chapter Are Applicable. The statements in §§135-
147 are applicable both to absolute and conditional promises in either formal or informal contracts.
§39. Beneficiaries Unidentified at the Time of Contract. It is not essential to the creation
of a right in a donee beneficiary or in a creditor beneficiary that he be identified when a contract
containing the promise is made.
§142. Variations of the Duty to a Donee Beneficiary by Agreement of Promisor and Promisee.
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The first problem relates to the rights which accrue under the policy to anyone
who may suffer personal injuries as a result of the operation of John Smith's car.
Apparently such a person is a creditor beneficiary under Section 133, and Section
143 presumably applies. But may John Smith, if amply solvent, release X Casualty
Company from all obligations under the policy while the claim of the injured
person remains unpaid? Section 143 does not answer that question explicitly. It
would seem possible to argue it persuasively either way. In many states the question
could hardly be argued without reference to statutes. Here, at any rate, is a basic
question with which a treatise on liability insurance would have to deal.
The second interesting question is: What kind of a beneficiary is the.person who
is "insured" under the policy because he drives John Smith's car with John Smith's
consent? He cannot be an "incidental beneficiary" because then the policy would
not protect him, as it doubtless does. He does not answer the description of a
"creditor beneficiary"; so he must be a "donee beneficiary," which he doubtless is.
But if so, do Sections 139 and i42 make X Casualty Company responsible to one
to whom John Smith lends his car during the original term of the policy but after
the policy has been cancelled by agreement between X Casualty Company and John
Smith? It seems scarcely possible that this question could be answered in the
affirmative, but Sections 139 and i42 seem easily capable of interpretation either way.
A third question, which cuts more deeply than the last two, is: How can an
insurance contract such as that which has just been quoted be legally valid at all?
It can hardly be thought that the law would enforce A's promise to indemnify B
against liability for a contemplated assault and battery. How can it be that the law
will permit John Smith to contract to shift onto other shoulders a tort liability which
has been "imposed upon" John Smith "by law"? The American Law Institute's
answer to this question is expressed in Section 572 of the Contracts Restatement, but
it is submitted that that answer is not complete. How can it be asserted with any
confidence that the contract does not "tend to induce" accidents caused by the
negligent driving of the car? Certainly there must be many drivers who, if they
Unless the power to do so is reserved, the duty of the promisor to the donee beneficiary cannot
be released by the promisee or affected by any agreement between the promisee and the promisor,
but if the promisee receives consideration for an attempted release or discharge of the promisor's
duty, the donee beneficiary can assert a right to the consideration so received, and on doing
so loses his right against the promisor.
§143- Variation of the Promisors Duty to a Creditor Beneficiary by Agreement of Promisor and
Promisee. A discharge of the promisor by the promisee in a contract or a variation thereof by
them is effective against a creditor beneficiary if,
(a) the creditor beneficiary does not bring suit upon the promise or otherwise materially
change his position in reliance thereon before he knows of the discharge or variation, and
(b) the promisee's action is not a fraud on creditors.
§147. Effect of a Promise of Incidental Benefit. An incidental beneficiary acquires by virtue
of the promise no right against the promisor or the promisee.
§572. Bargain to Indemnify Against Consequences of Committing a Tort. A bargain to indemnify
another against the consequences of committing a tortious act is illegal unless the performance
of the tortious act is only an undesired possibility in the performance of the bargain, and the
bargain does not tend to induce the act.
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could not have insurance, would either drive more cautiously or not drive at all.
If it be answered that a confident and unworried driver is normally safer than
an anxious and frightened one, are we to interpret the Restatement as meaning
that the effect of this particular policy on John Smith's personal psychology at the
time of the accident is triable whenever an action against X Casualty Company
upon the policy is brought? It hardly seems possible that that is the law. I submit,
with deference, that section 572 of the Contracts Restatement is an inadequate state-
ment of the doctrine which underlies the unquestioned validity of the insurance
against tort liability, and that the true ground of its validity must be found in a
re-examination of the foundation principles of the law of torts.
II
LIABILITY INSURANCE AND TORT
Let us now consider the legal consequences of some doings which might have
resulted in litigation but which, so far as I know, never did. I did not witness
these doings, but am reliably informed and believe that they occurred. Whether
they occurred or not, they are perfectly possible and suffice to illustrate the problem
to which I wish to call attention.
The Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad starts on the west bank of
the Hudson River in Hoboken opposite New York City, pierces the cliffs of
the palisades by a tunnel, and crosses the New Jersey meadows to the New Jersey
hills. In the hills, along the line of the railroad, are the towns of Orange, Montclair,
and other places favored by suburbanites who work in New York. It results that
the commutation traffic which crosses the Jersey meadows by this railroad is very
large. On its way over the meadows the railroad meets the Passaic River which it
crosses, or did cross, by a drawbridge. The waters of the Passaic River at this point
are navigable, tidal, and accessible by water from New York harbor by passing
around Jersey City and the south end of the palisades. The Delaware, Lackawanna
& Western Railroad maintains, or did maintain, a number of powerful tugboats
to handle freight lighters moving between points in New York harbor and its own
wharves.
About three o'clock one afternoon a tug which did not belong to the railroad
towed two barges up the Passaic River and approached the Lackawanna Railroad
drawbridge. The draw was raised to allow the tug and its tow to pass. While pass-
ing through the draw, one of the barges grounded between the bridge piers. The
barge was rigged with two masts which prevented the draw from being closed. The
draw tender telephoned to the Lackawanna's division superintendent, who presently
appeared on the scene along with a Lackwanna Railroad tug. This tug, under the
division superintendent's orders, attempted to pull the barge out of the draw, but
without success. The superintendent then requested permission of the barge captain
to attach the tug's hawser to the top of the barge's masts and break them off. Per-
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mission to do this was refused. The division superintendent and the tug's crew
thereupon overpowered the barge crew and proceeded to execute their plan by
force. The barge's masts were pulled down by the tug's hawser, and the evening
commuters to Montclair and the Oranges came home on time.
Was there a tort committed? And if so, who is to pay? There will be found
in the footnotes a number of sections taken from the Restatements of Torts" and
Agency,6 and the learned reader may exercise his ingenuity in determining what
5 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934). §2z8. Liability to the Person in Possession. One who without a
consensual or other privilege to do so, uses or otherwise intentionally intermeddles with a chattel which
is in the possession of another is liable for a trespass to such person if, but only if,
(a) the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality or value, or
(b) the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or
(c) bodily harm is thereby caused to the possessor or harm is caused to some person or thing
in which the possessor has a legally protected interest.
§262. Privilege Created by Public Necessity. One is privileged to use or otherwise intentionally
intermeddle with a chattel in the possession of another when such intermeddling is or is reasonably
believed to be necessary for the purpose of averting a public disaster.
§264. Abatement of Private Nuisance. One is privileged intentionally to intermeddle with chattels
in the possession of another for the purpose of abating a private nuisance created or maintained by
the possessor if such intermeddling is a reasonable means of abating the nuisance and if the
possessor of the chattel, upon demand, has failed to abate the nuisance or the actor reasonably
believes that such demand is impractical or useless.
§888. Effect of Acting at Command of or on Account of Another. A person whose conduct is
otherwise a tort is not relieved from liability therefor merely by the fact that his conduct is
pursuant to the command of or is on account of another.
eRE5srATEE NT, AGENCY (1933). §343. General Rule. An agent who does an act otherwise a
tort is not relieved from liability by the fact that he acted at the command of the principal or on account
of the principal, except where he is exercising a privilege of the principal, or a privilege held by him for
the protection of the principal's interests.
§401. Liability in Tort for Loss Caused. In accordance with the principles stated in the Re-
statement of Torts, an agent is subject to liability for loss caused to the principal by any breach
of duty except a breach of a duty arising wholly from a contract with the principal.
§438. Indemnity of Agent: General Principles. In the absence of specific terms in the agreement
of employment, the extent of the principal's duty to indemnify an agent for payments made
or losses suffered by the agent in the performance of authorized transactions or as a result of
such transactions is based upon a fair apportionment of the risks of the employment in light of busi-
ness customs, the relationship of the parties, and the nature of the agent's undertaking.
§439. When Duty of Indemnity Exists. Unless otherwise agreed, the principal is subject to a duty
to an agent, not barred by the illegality of his conduct, to reimburse him for or to exonerate
him from:
(a) authorized payments made by the agent on behalf of the principal;
(b) payments upon contracts upon which the agent is authorized to make himself liable,
and upon obligations arising from the possession or ownership of things which he is
authorized to hold on account of the principal;
(c) payments of damages to third persons which he is required to make on account of the
authorized performance of an act which constitutes a tort or a breach of contract;
(d) expenses of defending actions by third persons brought because of the agent's authorized
conduct, such actions being unfounded but not brought in bad faith; and
(e) payments resulting in benefit to the principal, made by the agent under such conditions
that it would be inequitable for indemnity not to be made.
§440. When No Duty of Indemnity. Unless otherwise agreed, the principal is not subject to a
duty to indemnify an agent:
(a) for pecuniary loss or other harm, not of benefit to the principal, arising from the
performance of unauthorized acts or resulting solely from the agent's negligence or other
fault; or
(b) if the principal has otherwise performed his duties to the agent, for physical harm
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rights these give to the railroad company and its superintendent and what liabilities
they impose on them in the situation which I have described. But it seems to me
that an uninstructed judge or jury would arrive at the correct solution with less
effort, and in a simpler way. "Tort" is Norman French for "wrong." Did the
Lackawanna Railroad's division superintendent do wrong? He did not-his conduct
was very creditable indeed. If he did not do wrong, certainly neither the railroad
company nor its patrons did so. But the fact remains that the barge owner is not
blameworthy and that his property has been sacrificed to the convenience of the
Orange and Montclair commuters and to the preservation of the Lackawanna Rail-
road Company's goodwill. Since the Lackawanna Railroad Company's treasury
represents both these interests, it should pay the cost of replacing the barge's masts.
There is no action of any kind against the division superintendent, but there should
be an action against the railroad company-and a jury, at least, is not likely to be
too much troubled over how the action may be classified in the law books. The
true classification, I submit, is neither tort nor contract, but debt, which, both his-
torically and analytically, is an independent category of the law. The principle upon
which the railroad company should be held liable is the same as that expressed in
Section I of the Restatement of Restitution,' the same as that which requires the state
to make compensation for taking by eminent domain. The whole transaction is of
the same essential nature as the transactions by which the railroad originally acquired
its right of way.
But why, someone may ask, this extended discussion of a hypothetical and ex-
ceptional case? The answer, I submit, is that the case is not as exceptional as it
seems. All the world's work is conducted under the daily pressure of necessities
which demand that less compelling interests be subordinated or brushed aside. The
manufacturer who must fill his orders, the bus driver who must make his schedule
cannot do what they are required to do without risk of injuring someone else. The
law attempts, so far as possible, to throw upon every enterprise the burden of com-
pensating those who suffer from its pursuit. A ruling that an enterprise must pay
for a particular injury which it causes is not necessarily a ruling that either
the enterpriser or his servants have done wrong.
III
A RECONNAISSANCE IN HISTORY
The pertinence of what has been said will, perhaps, be more apparent if we
remind ourselves of the course of history which has brought the liability insurance
business into being. The spate of actions of tort which characterized the second half
caused by the performance of authorized acts, harm suffered as a result of torts, other than
the tortious institution of suits, committed upon the agent by third persons because of his
employment, or harm suffered by the refusal of third persons to deal with him.7 REsrATEmENr, Rzsa'rruroN (r936). §i. Unjust Enrichment. A person who has been unjustly
enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other.
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of the nineteenth century was not made up, in any substantial measure, of actions
against individuals for their alleged personal wrongs. It was made up in the main
of actions against incorporated enterprises, against cities, railroads, and manufactur-
ing companies for alleged wrongs committed in the course of those enterprises by
their employees. A good deal of speculative energy has been expended over the
question why an employer admittedly guilty of no personal wrongdoing should
be held responsible for wrongs committed by someone in his employ. I shall not
attempt to re-examine that issue here. Instead I prefer to raise the question whether
many of the accidents for which tort judgments were rendered were the result of
wrongdoing, or even of anything properly described as negligence, on the part of
anyone, whether there were not thousands of verdicts brought in, and sustained,
against corporations where no jury would have brought in a verdict against any
individual whomsoever upon the evidence presented at the bar. Certainly it was a
matter of common gossip all through that era that no jury would decide a case
against a "corporation" on the basis of the evidence and the law as laid down by the
bench. One can scarcely doubt that the living tort law of the late nineteenth
century contained a very large element of the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher,8 a
doctrine that those who controlled and profited by the forces of steam, fire, and
electricity, should see to it that the forces which they had set in motion paid their
way.
The practice of liability insurance began with the practice of insuring "em-
ployers"--persons whom the law did not speak of as wrongdoers but as persons re-
sponsible for others' wrongs. The risks of tort liability in manufacturing and build-
ing were so great that the smaller enterprises would not incur them. It was to meet
this demand of the smaller enterprises for protection that the business of liability in-
surance originated and grew up. Many of the earlier policies, unlike the modern
policy which we have quoted, did not contain the underwriter's obligation to "pay"
the tort obligations of the insured. On the contrary, these policies limited themselves
very carefully to agreements to reimburse the insured for money actually collected
from him by legal process, or voluntarily paid out. Many a recent graduate has
gone through law school without being told that these policies were attacked on the
ground that they purported to relieve the insured from the consequences of his own
wrongdoing, and on the ground that the clause whereby the underwriter agreed
to defend the insured against lawsuits was a contract to commit the tort of main-
tenance by intermeddling in another's cause. The charge of maintenance was not
easy to answer, and was at one time sustained by the Missouri Supreme Court.' The
controversy did not cease until the general adoption of state statutes making it illegal
to contract for the mere reimbursement of money paid out on tort claims, enacting
that every liability insurance contract should be deemed a contract to pay whatever
8 Rylands and Horrocks v. Fletcher, L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (x868).j. C. Breeden v. Frankfort Marine, Accident & Plate Glass Insurance Co., 220 Mo. 327, 119 S. W.
576 (i9o9).
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the insured was legally obligated to pay the injured party, and enacting that the
obligation of the underwriter to pay the tort claim should be an asset of the insured
which the injured party might reach and apply, by a process in the nature of gar-
nishment, to the payment of his claim. The statutes were generally enacted about
191o.1° They were substantially contemporaneous with the workmen's compensation
acts generally enacted in the same decade, which required, or put pressure upon,
employers to insure their employees against all accidents occurring in the "course
and scope" of the employee's work.
Until about 192o liability insurance remained characteristically insurance of
employers or property owners against liability for the acts or defaults of others. It
was not until the vast proliferation of automobiles during the era between the two
world wars that liability insurance, by being extended to the drivers of these motor
cars, came to be extended to insuring against the legal consequences of the insured's
personal acts. Here again I venture the suggestion that the driver who takes out
liability insurance does not think of it as protecting him against the consequences
of his wrongs. He thinks of it as protecting himself and others against risks which
are inseparable from the operation of a locomotive on the public ways.
IV
SUGGESTIONS AND PROBLEMS
Everything that I have said about recent history is perfectly familiar to legal
scholars, and everything that I have said about the present is familiar not only to
lawyers but to all sorts of persons occupied with various aspects of the world's work.
Why, then, should the editor permit me to use the pages of this magazine to write
about it in this sketchy and fragmentary way? Thdre is indeed no reason why he
should do so except that these obvious facts seem to me to receive too little recog-
nition in the curricula and instruction currently offered by the law schools. As I
pointed out at the beginning, there is today no adequate treatise and no adequate
casebook on liability insurance law. What I have tried to demonstrate is that this
lack is a reflection of a profound inadequacy in the current organization of legal
teaching-that it is idle to expect any systematic treatment of liability insurance by
legal scholars until the whole law curriculum has been revised. Therefore, since
I have not the editor's permission to use his pages for the purposes of expounding a
complete Corpus Juris, the latter part of this discussion must be as fragmentary as
the first. I shall content myself with pointing out a few of the practical enterprises
which might be undertaken, and which ought now to be undertaken, if the opinions
which I have expressed are correct.
First. It appears to me that the traditional first year law course is defective in
that it plants in the student's mind the notion that the two elements of civil responsi-
10 These statutes were at first attacked as invasions of constitutional freedom of contract. The
United States Supreme Court did not finally sustain their validity until 1925. Merchants Mutual Auto-
mobile Liability Insurance Co. v. Smart, 267 U. S. 126 (r925).
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bility are contract and tort. The truth, I submit, is that the elements of civil re-
sponsibility are debt and trespass, and that contract, in the sense of exchange or
promise, is a compound put together out of these more elementary ideas. Everyone
will agree that social life would be hardly possible if individuals were free to inflict
damage on one another without compensation. It is not so often recognized that
the act of accepting a favor without returning it arouses almost equal resentment,
that the idea of an unpaid indebtedness is anterior to, and independent of, the idea
of a promise to repay. All this is abundantly demonstrated in the evolution of the
law of contract through the actions of debt, covenant, and special and general
assumpsit, but its importance is sometimes forgotten in the effort to modernize
everything. It is a curious and, I think, unfortunate fact that the problems ordinarily
dealt with in courses and casebooks on "Quasi-Contracts" should have been assembled
under so misleading a title, and that the age-old doctrines exemplified by the cases
on unjust enrichment should have had so little influence on the organization of the
first year curriculum as they have. It might well be a very fruitful enterprise for
some teacher to examine the content of the courses on tort and contract currently
offerec in his law school, to imagine another first year course in "Quasi-Contracts"
given out of one of the standard casebooks on that subjecf, and then to study the
interrelationships of the three courses and how their contents might be rearranged.
Second. The elements of liability insurance law, including the law of workmen's
compensation, should be included in any course which attempts to deal with the
law of negligent torts. A very large fraction of all the tort judgments rendered are
now paid by insurance companies, and in the absence of liability insurance would
probably not be paid at all. Both plaintiffs' and defendants' counsel are, of course,
well aware of this, and try to'settle their cases with that in mind. It results that
tort law and liability insurance law constitute in practice a single field. The student
who wants "practical" instruction will approve of their being taught together in
school.
Third. There is need for a thorough examination of the whole theory and
practice of insurance against tort liability in the light of the doctrines of Chapter
6 of the Contracts Restatement and the public policies underlying the law of torts.
The nature of the problem is well exemplified by the compulsory automobile in-
surance law of Massachusetts, which requires every owner of a motorcar, as a con-
dition of registering it for travel on the public highways, to procure either (1) a
"bond ... conditioned that the obligor shall within thirty days after the rendition
thereof satisfy all judgments rendered against him or against any person responsible
for the operation of the obligor's motor vehicle with his express or implied consent
in actions to recover damages for bodily injuries, including death at any time re-
sulting therefrom . . ." or (2) "a policy of liability insurance which provides in-
demnity for or protection to the insured and any person responsible for the operation
of the insured's motor vehicle with his express or implied consent against loss by
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reason of the liability to pay damages to others for bodily injuries, including death
at any time resulting therefrom ... arising out of the ownership, operation, main-
tenance, control or use upon the ways of the commonwealth of such motor
vehicle... ."" This statute, of course, was enacted to make sure that tort judgments
against the drivers of automobiles would be paid, and thf legislature apparently
regarded the bond and the insurance policy as practical equivalents to that end.
But it is obvious that they are not equivalents in their historical origins, that they are
not equivalents in legal theory, and that they are not equivalent in their practical con-
sequences so far as the driver of the automobile is concerned. In Massachusetts, at
least, the procedures for enforcing the two instruments are quite different. Suit
on the bond would be brought at law in the name of the Commonwealth for the
benefit of the injured party. Suit to enforce the insurance policy would be by
bill in equity to reach and apply the obligation of the policy to the payment of the
judgment against the driver of the car. And there might well be differences in the
substantive consequences, as we shall presently see.
Fourth. A very practical question of general national interest relates to the
precise area of tort liabilty against which the ordinary automobile liability policy
insures. It will be recalled that the policy quoted at the beginning of this article
insures against "liability imposed . . . by law for damages caused by accident and
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile."'12 Suppose
John Smith, the insured under the policy, finds his running board boarded by a
hitchhiker and throws him off intentionally by stepping on the gas. The hitchhiker
brings an action of tort against John Smith and recovers judgment. Is this a judg-
ment which the X Casualty Company must pay?
The Massachusetts court has answered this question in the negative 3 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has aswered it in the affirma-
tive. 4 From the standpoint of legal analysis the answer of the Massachusetts court
seems clearly right. There is a great body of judicial decision construing policies
which insure against death or injury by "accident," and it is well settled that whether
a given event is "accidental" is to be determined from the standpoint of the person
whom the policy insures. The hitchhiker's fall was not accidental from John
Smith's standpoint, therefore, the tort liability which he incurred is not one which
the X Casualty Company agreed to pay.
This problem, however, runs far beyond a mere question of the interpretation of
the insurance contract, and raises basic questions of principle under liability insurance
law. Would the Massachusetts court reach the same conclusion under a policy
drawn in accordance with the statute which we have quoted? That statute requires
that the policy provide "indemnity . . . against loss by reason of the liability to pay
t' MAss. GEN. LAws c. 90, 534 A (r932).
12 (Italics supplied.)
"Sontag v. Galer, 279 Mass. 309, 181 N. E. 182 (932).
"' New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Jones, 135 F. 2d x91 (6th Cir. 1943).
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damages ... arising out of the operation ... of such motor vehicle."'" These words
apparently cover the present case. But, if so, do they also cover the case where the
automobile is used as an instrument of intentional murder? There is, of course,
no public policy against giving the injured parties a means of financial indemnity
in such situations, but to hold that the driver of the car is to be "indemnified" is a
novel doctrine, which seems contrary to Section 572 of the Contracts Restatement.' "
Evidently we are back again to the ancient question of how far the law of torts
is to be regarded as an instrument for compensating the injured, and how far it
is to be regarded as an instrument for punishing the guilty. The effect of the
Massachusetts statute, which seems to be to make the pursuit of these two purposes
inconsistent in the present situation, was probably unintentional. Indeed, it seems
likely that the real legislative policy would be expressed more exactly by a statute
requiring every motorist to file a surety bond for the payment of judgments rendered
against him, and leaving it optional with him whether to procure insurance against
liability as well.
The present situation in Massachusetts sums up very vividly a whole chapter
in the history of legal thought. When insurance against tort liability first began to
be practiced it was widely held that there could be no liability in contract except in
favor of a person to whom the promise sued on had been given or from whom the
consideration for it moved. A fortiori there could be no liability in favor of a person
not designated by the promise when it was made. It was because of this that the
bonds exacted from executors, administrators, sheriffs and others to protect persons
who might be injured by their defalcations were made to run in favor of designated
public officers or corporations who recovered judgments thereon in trust for the
persons who suffered loss. That is why the surety bond which the operator of a
motor vehicle may file in Massachusetts at his election is made to run in favor of
the Commonwealth. If the legislators of Massachusetts had foreseen the successive
steps in the progress of the technological revolution, they would probably have
enacted that no one might operate a steam engine, a gas works, or an electric dynamo
without filing such a bond, and the bond, rather than the liability insurance policy,
would now be the instrument normally filed by the owner of an automobile. The
technological revolution would then have been accompanied by a parallel evolution
of contract law. Instead of which we have now reached approximately the result
which would have been reached by that route via the law of torts, the doctrine of
respondeat superior, and the liability insurance policy, which seems gradually to be
evolving into a combined insurance policy and surety bond.
Fifth. Another problem of general interest is the proper interpretation of the
clause which defines the meaning of "the insured." In the policy which we have
quoted this includes any person who uses the automobile "with the permission ot
the named insured." Other policies use different phrases. But whatever the phrase,
MALss. GEN. LAws c. 90, §34 A (1932).
ae See note 4 supra.
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there is usually room for interpretation in deciding whether the permission must
be expressed or may be implied from the circumstances, and whether or not the
insurance continues if the borrower keeps the car longer, takes it farther, or uses it
for a purpose other than the lender of the car agreed he might.
This clause again raises the question whether insurance against tort liability
should be regarded as primarily for the benefit of the tort plaintiff or the tort de-
fendant. As the clause is drawn, it seems to be merely an accommodation extended
to the servants of the named insured and to his friends who may borrow his car.
But when the purchase of such a policy is made compulsory, as it is in Massachusetts,
for the benefit of persons who may be injured by the operation of the car on the
highways, it seems hard to see why the reason behind the statute does not require
the bond or the insurance policy to cover everyone who may drive the car either
with or without the owner's consent.
Sixth. Another problem which would well repay serious study is that of in-
surance against accidents within the family. The ancient rule, which still prevails
generally, is that no action of tort for personal injuries will lie between husband and
wife or between parent and minor child.1V 7 While that doctrine prevails it is, of
course obvious that a policy which insures against "liability imposed ... by law for
damages" does not apply to the case of a man who injures his own wife and chil-
dren.' In recent years the doctrine that there is no tort liability in such a case
has been questioned; it has even been argued that the prevalence of liability insurance
is itself a reason why the doctrine should now be relegated to the past.' This, I
submit, is arguing in a circle; it is saying that an ancient doctrine of domestic
relations law may now be abandoned because the bad consequences of its abandon-
ment can be mitigated by holding insurance companies to a contract they did not
make. It is interesting to note in this connection that when the New York legis-
lature was recently prevailed upon to make actions of tort for- personal injuries
available between husband and wife and between parent and child, it enacted simul-
taneously a statute to the effect that no liability insurance policy should be construed
to apply to such actions unless it embodied an explicit provision to that effect.' °
Once again we see the importance of a clear legal theory, not only of liability
insurance, but also of domestic relations law. The whole difficulty of the problem,
from either standpoint, revolves around the meaning of the phrase "liability imposed
. .. by law for damages." That the classic domestic relations law did not permit
actions of tort between husband and wife and parent and child is true enough. But
it imposed on the husband and father the duty to support his family in all con-
tingencies, and if they suffered personal injuries, either through his own fault or
, JOSEPH W. MADDEN, HANDBOOK OF T=E LAW OF PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS §69, 138 (r931)-
15 Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N. E. 2d 438 (1938).
19 WILLAM L. PROSsER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 897-908 (94).
'0 N. Y. DomEsTIa- RELATIONS LAW §57 as amended by L. 1937, c. 669; N. Y. INSURANCV LAw
§167(3); Fuchs v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America, 258 App. Div. 603, 17 N. Y.,S. 2d
338 (2d Dep't 1940).
468 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
another's the burden of that duty was, of course, increased. There is no reason why
the risk of personal injuries to a family due to the husband and father's carelessness
should not be insured against, but that is not a legal problem. It is a problem of
drafting the proper policy and determining what the premium ought to be.
Seventh. Another persistent problem which remains, after twenty years, without
solution is that raised by the limitation on the underwriter's liability. Suppose the
underwriter's liability is limited to $io,ooo for each person, and that $2o,ooo damages
are claimed. The plaintiff offers to settle for $io,ooo. The underwriter's normal
reaction is to ask the insured to contribute to the settlement. The insured's normal
reaction is to insist that the underwriter pay the whole. The underwriter and the
insured cannot agree as to what proportion of the $Io,ooo each shall contribute, and
in consequence the settlement is lost. Suppose the action is tried and the plaintiff
recovers judgment for $2o,ooo. May the insured demand that the underwriter pay
the whole $2o,ooo on the ground that the underwriter was bound to accept the
opportunity to settle for $ioooo and to pay the settlement in full?
Twenty-five years ago the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the
underwriter might be liable if its failure to accept the settlement was the result of
negligence.2 The New York Court of Appeals took the opposite position,22 and
the question has been disputed, without any appreciable progress toward solution,
ever since. The question is, in fact, insoluble so long as the law permits a situation
in which (i) the underwriter assumes the burden, and reserves the right of defending
any lawsuit which may be brought against the insured driver; (2) the underwriter's
liability is limited to an amount smaller than the maximum which the plaintiff may
recover from the insured driver; and (3) the underwriter assumes full liability for
any judgment which may be rendered against the insured driver up to this minimum
amount. If there is any principle of insurance law which can truly be said to be
without exception, it is that a valid insurance contract can be distinguished from an
invalid wager only by the fact that the insurance contract produces a complete
identity of interest between the underwriter and the insured. Where the under-
writer is unable or unwilling to carry the whole risk from which the insured wishes
to be protected, this identity of interest can be achieved only by the method of "co-
insurance," i.e., by a contract under which the underwriter carries a specified share
of the insured's risk. Where a specified share of the risk is indeterminate owing
to the fact that the risk itself is without limit, the underwriter can be protected
only by a "valued policy," i.e., by a contract which sets a definite valuation upon the
thing insured.
Valued policies are, of course, impossible in liability insurance so long as the law
sets no upper limit on the amounts which may be recovered in actions of tort. In
workmen's compensation insurance the risk can be, and is, valued, because compensa-
"Douglas v. United States Fidelity & Casualty Co., 81 N. H. 371, 127 A. 708 (1924).
" Best Building Co. v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 247 N. Y. 451, x6o N. E. 9x (1928).
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tion is fixed at a percentage of average wages, so that the premium can be computed
on the basis of the insured's payroll. The price of the solution of the particular
problem now under discussion is legislation fixing a maximum recovery for tortious
personal injuries, and the refusal of underwriters to insure for less than this maxi-
mum unless the doctrine of coinsurance is applied.
V
CONCLUSION
The idea of insurance is a comprehensive and pervasive one. If it is combined
with another idea as comprehensive and pervasive as that of tort, the resulting
compound is likely to permeate and color every department of the law. The practice
of insurance against tort liability is founded on the combination of these two ideas.
The very limited treatment which the subject has hitherto enjoyed in the law curricu-
lum is a measure of that curriculum's resistance to a field of thought which inevitably
disrupts the harmony of the accepted scheme. What I have attempted here is to
suggest, in the merest outline, the nature of the legal system to which the practice
of liability insurance leads.

